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ABSTRACT
One of the most challenging endeavours economic theorists currently face is the
integration of emotions in the conceptual frameworks used to explain the choic-
es and the behaviour of agents. Emotional decisions are much harder to under-
stand, evaluate and analyse than rational ones, because emotions are diffuse,
difficult to isolate and to categorise, and also because they correspond to per-
sonal inner-states that might be externalised in so many different ways. This
paper suggests the use of a possible classification of emotions in order to guide
economists when developing their emotional-oriented decision-making models.
The classification is the one proposed by psychologist Robert Plutchik through
his popular ‘wheel of emotions’, a diagram that highlights the existence of a few
basic emotions that might acquire, each of them, various different tones or inten-
sities. 
1. INTRODUCTION
THE TITLE OF THIS PAPER MERGES TWO ELEMENTS. The second part is the end ofa statement by Thaler (2000 p 139) where emotions that may be relevantfor economic behaviour and economic analysis are enumerated; the first
part makes reference to an influential researcher in the field of the psycholo-
gy of emotions, namely Robert Plutchik, who presented a categorisation of dif-
ferent emotions human beings may experience (Plutchik 1980).
Emotions are pervasive in Economics: they are decisive in shaping indi-
vidual preferences and levels of utility; they represent a fundamental driver of
the decision-making process of economic agents; and they are prone to social
contagion, thus helping in generating aggregate phenomena. Although many
researchers recognise the relevance of emotions in shaping economic out-
comes, a unifying theory of emotion-based Economics is far from being accom-
plished. This is, to a large extent, the result of the difficulty in defining, clas-
sifying and setting boundaries on emotions. In contrast with rational behav-
iour, which can be interpreted plainly as emotion-free, emotional behaviour
might represent many different realities; to account for these realities all at
once is virtually impossible.
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The analogy Plutchik (1980) uses between the array of possible human
emotions and a colour palette is suggestive: as colours, emotions have many
shades and the differences between some of them are so subtle that they may
be almost unnoticeable. Can we distinguish precisely between regret, grief,
sorrow, remorse or sadness? And between rejoice, joy, happiness or delight?
Moreover, emotions are difficult to observe and measure; as the same author
highlights elsewhere (Plutchik 2001), emotions are personal inner-states that
seldom can be expressed and conceptualised in an intelligible form; when one
experiences a mix of emotions, it is hard to identify without ambiguities which
are they and to what extent each of them contributes to that mix.
From this perspective, it is no wonder that despite the efforts of eco-
nomic thinkers to incorporate emotions into the sphere of economic analysis,
we end up with a dispersed set of contributions that, although meaningful,
cannot be integrated and unified in a straightforward way. The main purpose
of this paper is thus to launch the debate on how to assemble a structured
map of emotions and their evolution, a map that may contribute to the
demanding goal of setting up a unified economic theory of emotions.
The starting point has to be a classification of emotions that, unambigu-
ously, separates them into different compartments. Here, we adopt the classifi-
cation suggested by Robert Plutchik in his psycho-evolutionary theory of emo-
tions. Such classification has the merit of condensing into a few categories what
the author identifies as being basic or prototype emotions. These are joy, trust,
fear and surprise; the four basic emotions have basic polar opposites, which are,
respectively, sadness, disgust, anger and anticipation. Every other emotion or
feeling one can think of can be expressed as a more or less intense manifesta-
tion of the proposed primary emotions or as a combination of primary emotions.
We advocate that classifying emotions in the context of economic sci-
ence is vital at three decisive levels, which constitute the main reasons moti-
vating this research. First, a structure is assembled to carefully stow the dis-
perse contributions available in the branch of behavioural economics dealing
with emotions, thus allowing us to take an integrated view over a plentiful but
apparently disconnected literature. Second, one can employ the proposed
classification to highlight the features that allow formalising an analytical
structure dealing with the dynamics of the emotions that economic agents
experience, in a more or less general context. Third, by compartmentalising
emotions one can more accurately evaluate their role with respect to the
impact they have over attention and the search for information and knowl-
edge, which are central elements of any decision-making process. These three
layers of analysis are explored in the paper; prior to that, the conceptual
instrument that is the wheel of emotions is presented and scrutinised.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the classification
of emotions proposed by Robert Plutchik. Section 3 offers a brief and selective
review of the literature that has explored the economic implications of assum-
ing that individuals experience distinct and evolving emotions. In Section 4,
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we highlight three main features relating the socio-economic role of emotions,
namely non-controllability, contagion and pervasiveness. In Section 5, a dis-
crete-time dynamic model is sketched to interpret the propagation of emotions
in the context of the discussed categorisation of emotional states. Section 6
takes a step forward by arguing that understanding emotions, their idiosyn-
crasies and their dynamics is meaningful as a first stage of a more compre-
hensive démarche, which consists in discerning how emotions may influence
attention and the search for information and knowledge. Section 7 concludes.
2. PLUTCHIK’S WHEEL OF EMOTIONS
The psycho-evolutionary theory of emotions proposed by Robert Plutchik is
built upon a series of simple fundamental premises. The basic postulate is
that despite the multiple different forms under which emotions can be
expressed, such evidence does not invalidate the identification of a small num-
ber of basic or primary emotions. Primary emotions are essentially four: joy,
trust, fear and surprise. These emotions are ideal types, meaning that they can
manifest themselves with various degrees of intensity. Furthermore, each of
the basic emotions has a polar opposite, respectively sadness, disgust, anger
and anticipation. As with colours, by mixing primary emotions, one can obtain
any kind of conceivable emotional state, i.e., every possible emotion can be
expressed through the combination of their basic forms. 
The interpretation about the meaning, classification and interrelation
between emotions offered by Plutchik can be condensed in a diagram that takes
the designation of a wheel of emotions. The wheel of emotions comprises four
axes, each one containing a primary emotion, the respective polar opposite, and
weak and strong manifestations of the basic and opposite emotions. These axes
are represented in Figure 1; darker boxes, at the extremes, are associated with
stronger emotional states or stronger emotional experiences.
Axis 1
Axis 2
Axis 3
Axis 4
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Figure 1: The four axes of the wheel of emotions.
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The schematic representation of emotional states in Figure 1 is useful at two
main levels. First, it allows for the individualisation of classes of emotions;
although one can experience at the same time, for instance, grief, disgust,
anger and surprise, Plutchik's wheel assigns each of the mentioned emotions
to distinct classes that can be scrutinised separately. Second, within each
class, emotional states can be ranked; this rank provides a starting point to
address the evolution of emotions. For each axis, one can expect individuals
to perambulate across the different categories: sometimes, a weak form of the
emotion dominates; in other moments, a stronger emotion may be felt; yet in
other time periods, the opposite emotional state might prevail.
Besides identifying main axes and establishing an ordered sequence of
emotions, the wheel of emotions also contemplates the possibility of formation
of feelings as the outcome of the combination of each pair of basic emotions
and/or the respective opposites. Most of the feelings in this way generated are
frequently considered, by both psychologists and economists, as falling also in
a broad definition of emotions. Although we maintain, for a matter of organi-
sation of ideas, the separation between emotions (those highlighted in Figure
1) and feelings that result from combining emotions, the literature survey in
the following section approaches both, since in many cases trying to separate
them is an unrewarding task.
In Figure 2, the feelings that emerge from combining emotions are pre-
sented. The combination of the 24 identified emotional states gives rise to 24
different feelings human beings may experience.
The schematic representations in Figure 2 provide complementary ele-
ments for our discussion on the role of emotions in explaining human behav-
iour, beyond the framework already established with the classification of pri-
mary emotions and their direct variants. According to the diagrams in the fig-
ure, an optimistic individual is one who simultaneously experiences emotions
of joy and anticipation; envy is the result of sadness and anger; alarm comes
from fear and surprise, and so forth.
While somehow simplistic and far from consensual,  the wheel of emo-
tions, and the classification of emotions and feelings it provides, is a useful
tool to organise ideas about emotions and their dynamics. This tool furnishes
us with a map to guide us across the voluminous economics literature that
addresses individual and collective decision-making and, hopefully, it can
assist in elaborating a general and comprehensive approach to emotions in
economics.
3. ECONOMICS WITH EMOTIONS
In a detailed survey about the role of emotions in economic research, Walde
(2015a) reminds us that they were a central element of some of the contribu-
tions of classical economists. Most notably, Jeremy Bentham and Stanley
Jevons discussed in detail how economics could be conceived as the calculus
O Gomes
- 40 -
Economic Issues, Vol. 22, Part 1, March 2017
- 41 -
Class of
feelings 1
Class of
feelings 2
Class of
feelings 3
Class of
feelings 4
Figure 2 - Feelings as combinations of emotions
Class of
feelings 5
Class of
feelings 6
of pleasure and pain and how agents should behave in order to avoid pain and
search for pleasure. Despite these early contributions, however, economics
has evolved to be, in its essence, an emotion-free science. The core of economic
analysis has purged emotions and has focused on the notions of rational
choice and rational behaviour. With these notions, scientists were able to
develop many important and powerful economic theories that cover individual
decision-making, market relations, political choices and the performance of
the macro economy.
Still, humans experience emotions and, unarguably, emotions drive
behaviour. Many decisions with economic and financial implications, at micro
and macro levels, are triggered by curiosity, contempt, despair or any other
feelings or emotions mentioned in the classification offered in Section 2.3 The
meaningful question is, then, the following: given the pervasive link between
emotions and behaviour, why have emotions played such an insignificant role
in mainstream economic analysis so far?
The answer provided by Thaler (2000) to this question is of a practical
nature: economists avoid emotions because rational agents are easier to bring
to the models. Theoretical models explain how the economy would work if
agents acted rationally in every occasion: what, one must recognise, is a use-
ful benchmark to start addressing the complex nature of economic problems.
However, if we stop here, we might end up turning the analysis upside down;
in a strict view of the economic orthodoxy, an outcome that departs from what
the model predicts is not the result of a flaw of the model, but of a flaw on
human behaviour: emotions got in the way, making reality to deviate from
what the rationality-based setup predicts. Because science is supposed to
explain the real and not the ideal, a careful observation of the human behav-
iour must precede any effort to address and study economic decisions and
events, whatever the context. Therefore, the quest for the implications of
human emotions is essential for economic thinking.
Although dispersed, the emotion-related economics literature is volu-
minous. In order to systematise it, some criterion is required for the selection
and ordering of the most relevant works. Our criterion is the combination of
Plutchik's emotions as suggested in Section 2. Table 1 refers to a series of con-
tributions that we can group into six different cells. Each cell respects to a pair
of the identified basic emotions. Obviously, this classification is not complete-
ly tight; several of the mentioned articles also touch on other emotions besides
the two that are highlighted or give particular attention to just one emotion.
Nevertheless, in essence, we believe that the table serves the purpose of offer-
ing a relatively elucidative map on how emotions have been treated in the eco-
nomics literature in the last few years.
The proposed classification includes both consolidated and popular
theories in economic science, as the regret theory or the Lowenstein’s
approach to visceral factors, and disperse literature on curiosity, envy, guilt or
fear. Regardless of the possibility of highlighting a few important contributions
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Regret and disappointment
theories
• Loomes and Sugden (1982,
1986); Gul (1991); Bleichrodt
and Wakker (2015).
Projection bias
• Loewenstein et al (2003);
Kahneman and Thaler
(2006).
Optimism and pessimism
• Hirshleifer (2001); Faria
(2011); De Grauwe (2012);
Angeletos and La’O (2014);
Wigniolle (2014); Gomes
(2015). 
Visceral factors and anger
• Loewenstein (2000); Zizzo
(2008).
Economic role of envy
• Grolleau et al (2009);
Alvarez-Cuadrado and Van
Long (2012); Ahrens and
Snower (2014); Gershman
(2014).
Economic role of pride
• Antonetti and Maklan
(2014); Maccheroni et al
(2014); Pawlowski et al
(2014); Ha and Jang (2015);
Magee (2015). 
Economic role of guilt
• Miettinen and Suetens
(2008); Battigalli et al
(2013).
Trust and reciprocity
• Ortmann et al (2000); Cox
(2009); Kanagaretnam et al
(2010); Akai and Netzer
(2012); Charness and
Shmidov (2014).
Sentimentality and remorse
• Eisenhauer (2004); Ho
(2012); Mungan (2012).
Joy
Trust
Fear
Emotion
Axes Surprise Fear Trust
Suspense and curiosity
• Kim et al (2013); Ely et al
(2015); Hill et al (2016).
Fatalistic behaviour
• Sunstein (1998);
D’Orlando et al (2011);
Shapiro and Wu (2011);
Ruiu (2014).
Cynicism in organisations
and market transactions
• Ert et al (2014); Lee and
Mao (2015).
Shame in economic contexts
• Mathew (2010); Yi and
Baumgartner (2011); Jaffe
et al (2015).
Combining trust and fear
• Cox et al (2008); Busso
(2014).
Trust and development
• Dearmon and Grier
(2009); Ozcan and
Bjornskov (2011);
Bjornskov and Méon (2015)
Anticipatory emotions
• Caplin and Leahy (2001);
Bernheim and Thomadsen
(2005); Epstein and Kopylov
(2007); Koszegi and Rabin
(2007); Cowley (2013).
Stress, anxiety and self-con-
trol
• Gifford Jr (2002); Ali
(2011); Gambetti and
Giusberti (2012); Walde
(2015b).
Table 1: Selected work on emotions and Economics
on emotion research in economics, the most outstanding inference one can
make from Table 1 is that, in fact, we are far from achieving an integrated the-
ory of emotions; each emotion disturbs rational behaviour in its own specific
way, as a result of its peculiar features, but no definitive general rules can be
drawn from a cross examination of the references in the table.
In what follows, a brief discussion on each of the subjects referred to in
the table is set forth.
Emotions, when attached to economic processes, are most of the time
associated with utility; the utility agents draw from consumption of a given
good depends on a subjective evaluation that is shaped by the emotions expe-
rienced before, at, and after the moment in which the act of consumption
takes place. Thus, it is no wonder that one of the most consolidated theories
of emotions in economics is associated with how agents attribute value to con-
sumption experiences. Regret theory, as initially proposed by Loomes and
Sugden (1982), highlights how utility not only depends on the consumption of
a given good at a given moment, but also on the comparison of the effective
consumption experience with its direct alternatives. Utility is lowered when
people feel regret, i.e., when people realise that an alternative consumption
choice would have been better, and utility rises when people feel rejoice, i.e.,
when they are reassured that they made the best possible choice. Regret and
rejoicing are, thus, quantifiable emotions that may be integrated in a straight-
forward analysis of utility.
Besides allowing for elegantly introducing emotions into utility theory,
the approach to regret and rejoice also unveils how the departure from the
pure rationality setup might modify and re-shape some of the established wis-
dom in economics. In particular, in this case, the analysis has served to show
how fragile are the axioms of revealed preferences: under regret and rejoice,
the transitivity of preferences does not necessarily hold. See Bleichrodt and
Wakker (2015) for a survey on how regret theory has evolved since the origi-
nal Loomes-Sugden model.
A framework related to regret and rejoice, initially developed by the
same two authors, Loomes and Sugden (1986), and later discussed in a more
general setting by Gul (1991), highlights the role of disappointment, also in the
context of utility theory. Disappointment and its opposite, elation, play a role
similar to regret and rejoice in influencing utility levels; the difference is that
while regret (rejoice) exists relatively to a unique alternative, disappointment
(elation) is measured by comparing the utility of a specific choice with the
expected utility given all the available choices. Again, violations of the con-
ventional expected utility model under strict rational behaviour are identified,
although the implications of assuming one or the other type of emotions are
not exactly identical.
Regret, rejoice, disappointment and elation are relatively easy to locate
in the classification of emotions adopted. Basically, they are found in the right
side of the class of feelings 1 in Figure 2. They are necessarily associated with
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the surprise emotion (in fact, they are analysed in the context of utility under
uncertainty, and in this case uncertainty and surprise are close concepts) and
to joy or sadness, depending on which of these two polar feelings is being con-
sidered.
Attaching emotions of joy and surprise to utility brings to the discus-
sion of economic choices a series of other intricate problems that are absent
in the rationality paradigm. One of the most debated of these problems relates
to the idea of projection bias (Loewenstein et al 2003). Because individuals
make decisions today regarding the future, they must evaluate expected
future outcomes independently of the current state, but they often do not:
there is a projection bias because individuals tend to anchor their future pref-
erences to current emotional states, i.e., emotions today are likely to distort
decisions made today concerning future outcomes (when the same emotional
state will probably no longer prevail). This type of bias led Kahneman and
Thaler (2006) to distinguish between two types of utility: decision utility and
experienced utility; the first relates to what one wants, the second to what one
experiences. Ex ante emotions, attached with decision utility, and ex post
emotions, related to experienced utility, certainly will not be coincidental.
The first diagram of Figure 2 highlights two other feelings that are
essential for the analysis of many economic phenomena: optimism and pes-
simism. These two feelings are central elements of the new macroeconomic lit-
erature on business cycles that has recovered the Keynesian idea that animal
spirits or sentiments are the main determinant of observed output fluctua-
tions. Waves of optimism and pessimism may emerge, in this context, as the
result of a departure from the paradigm of strict rationality (De Grauwe 2012)
or as the result of informational constraints (Angeletos and La’O 2014). In any
of the cases, it is recognised that individuals are subject to transient moods or
emotions that, on the aggregate, are a major contributor to the observed cycli-
cal pattern of the trajectories of the main macro variables.
In Gomes (2015), a model of sentiment evolution is proposed; in this
model, agents are allocated to a few sentiment categories (neutrality, exuber-
ant optimism, non-exuberant optimism, exuberant pessimism and non-exu-
berant pessimism) and they will evolve across categories given a simple set of
local interaction rules. The idea is to show that feelings may spread as indi-
viduals exchange personal experiences, generating an aggregate outcome that
in the long-run, instead of converging to a fixed-point equilibrium, will even-
tually reflect the formation of waves of optimism and pessimism.
Another relevant field of study where optimism and pessimism play an
essential role, is finance. Following the influential contribution of Hirshleifer
(2001) on the impact of investor psychology on asset pricing, there have been
various attempts to explore the role of sentiments in explaining some of the
most evident anomalies in financial markets. For instance, Wigniolle (2014)
addresses the role of optimistic and pessimistic feelings in creating the envi-
ronment that leads to the occurrence of financial bubbles.
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Emotions related with optimism and pessimism may also be found in
the economic growth literature. Faria (2011) studies the dynamics of a modi-
fied version of a standard optimal growth model. In this model, joy and sorrow
are also, alongside with consumption, arguments of the utility function.
Furthermore, joy and sorrow can be found in the production function: they
influence managerial skills, thus contributing to a more or less productive
work environment (i.e., emotions are assumed to influence productivity). The
standard optimal growth model augmented with joy and sorrow as control
variables implies, in the formalised framework, the existence of multiple equi-
libria: there is an optimistic solution, a pessimistic solution and a neutral
solution; this last one will be coincidental with the outcome of the standard
neoclassical growth model; the other two respect to favourable and
unfavourable long-term steady-states that originate in high or low levels of joy
relative to sorrow.
Passing to a different quadrant of the scheme in Table 1, let us now
focus on the relationship between the emotions of trust and surprise.
Combining trust and surprise, feelings of curiosity, cynicism or fatalism
become relevant (see the fifth diagram in Figure 2). Concerning curiosity and
suspense, one may highlight the work of Kim et al (2013), which systematises
a theory of curiosity in economics. They associate this feeling with the utility
one can draw directly from information, even if this information is irrelevant
from the point of view of attaining an economic payoff. People like to know,
regardless of the utility of such knowledge, and the actions that curiosity trig-
gers have economic implications. In formal terms, that study associates
curiosity to a biological mechanism to lower entropy.
Similar reasoning is explored in Ely et al (2015). These authors propose
a formal model to address the entertainment utility that suspense and sur-
prise produce; in this model, agents will search for information, despite the
non-instrumental nature of such information. Some agents have a preference
for surprise, others a preference for suspense; in both cases, the standard util-
ity function is modified to accommodate such preferences, implying changes
relative to the standard rational benchmark. In a more specific context, Hill et
al (2016) discuss how creating curiosity in consumers, through marketing
strategies, may increase the motivation to purchase. Marketing and advertis-
ing actions exert influence over households by appealing to some of their emo-
tions. By stimulating some emotions and by refraining from others, these
actions are important to influence consumer behaviour.
Fatalism, understood as a combination of emotions of anticipation and
trust, has also been subject to debate in the economics literature. Some ref-
erences at this level include Sunstein (1998), D’Orlando et al (2011), Shapiro
and Wu (2011) and Ruiu (2014). These studies emphasise relevant issues on
the relation between emotions and economic behaviour. First, it is stressed
that fatalism is often selective, i.e., identical risks are frequently approached
with different degrees of concern; second, fatalism is associated with the
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intrinsic propensity of individuals expecting the occurrence of the worst pos-
sible scenarios, for example in what concerns labour market participation and
entrepreneurship activities; third, fatalism is also associated with household
savings behaviour. In this last respect, fatalistic individuals are seen as those
who believe that they have little or no control over future outcomes. This view
results in theoretical reasoning and empirical observation both indicating that
moderately risk averse and highly risk averse individuals will behave differ-
ently: for the first, savings decrease with fatalism, while for the second type,
the opposite will occur.
A last important topic to explore concerning trust/disgust and sur-
prise/anticipation is cynicism. Ert et al (2014) and Lee and Mao (2015)
analyse cynicism in market relations and in organisational contexts. The first
study, although realising that communication is a central element in improv-
ing the efficiency of market relations, notes that this communication may
involve a dark side: a cynical attitude of the market players may jeopardise the
market outcome. The second focuses on organisational change and attaches
the outcome of this change to the predisposition of the workers; if they adopt
a negative attitude towards change, this may imply distress and cynicism that
eventually attenuate or eliminate the expected gains of the adopted change.
To the sphere of fear and surprise one may allocate studies on antici-
patory feelings, such as those of Caplin and Leahy (2001), Bernheim and
Thomadsen (2005), Koszegi and Rabin (2007), and Cowley (2013). These stud-
ies also focus, along with some of the previously mentioned, on expected util-
ity and on how utility results may be distorted by emotions related to the act
of consumption. In particular, these authors concentrate on the analysis of
the emotions and feelings people experience when facing uncertainty about
future outcomes. Feelings such as hopefulness, excitement, alarm or anxiety
exert influence on the deliberative process of individuals and may determine
choices. Furthermore, such feelings are also linked to time inconsistency
issues; anxiety, for instance, might increase significantly as one approaches
the timing of a given event (or, in the words of Epstein and Kopylov 2007, peo-
ple may get ‘cold feet’ ) .
In a same vein, a few more or less dispersed research contributions
tackle related issues: Gifford Jr (2002) and Ali (2011) construct models of
choice under uncertainty to address self-control; Gambetti and Giusberti
(2012) analyse the impact of anger and anxiety over the financial decisions of
agents (concluding that anger triggers risky decisions and anxiety, on the con-
trary, typically leads to conservative financial decisions); Walde (2015b) focus-
es on stress and on how this feeling impacts instantaneous utility.
Turning now to the fear-joy relation, we start by highlighting the promi-
nent contribution of Loewenstein (2000), who conducts a reflection on the eco-
nomic implications of a particular class of emotions, called visceral factors,
that pushes individuals towards action; emotions such as anger, fear or pas-
sion require an immediate and disruptive change of behaviour. Despite their
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transient nature, actions originating from visceral factors have long-lasting
consequences and therefore must not be neglected when assessing decision-
making processes. Interestingly, the analysis of the implications of visceral
actions might not be as hard as one might think: in fact, visceral behaviour
may lead to a much more predictable outcome than a thorough cognitive
deliberation on a given subject (the visceral reaction to anger, e.g. punching
someone in the face, is much more predictable than a carefully planned and
elaborated vendetta). For a detailed discussion on the economic role of a spe-
cific visceral factor, anger, see Zizzo (2008).
Table 1 indicates that the various feelings originating from the combi-
nation of the emotions of joy and fear have been accounted for in economic
research, namely envy, pride and guilt, all of which are present in the discus-
sion of economic issues. Relating envy, the studies of Grolleau et al (2009),
Alvarez-Cuadrado and Van Long (2012), Ahrens and Snower (2014) and
Gershman (2014) emphasise that this feeling is a fundamental driver of
human behaviour: people will care not only about their own consumption level
or labour market position, but also about the consumption or labour market
position of their reference group; therefore, envy may have constructive or
destructive effects since it may lead to actions to increase personal effort or to
sabotage the effort of others.
Pride and guilt also have a place in economic theory. Examples of stud-
ies dealing with one or both of these feelings include Miettinen and Suetens
(2008), Battigalli et al (2013), Antonetti and Maklan (2014), Maccheroni et al
(2014), Pawlowski et al (2014), Ha and Jang (2015) and Magee (2015). People
feel pride from belonging to a given community (e.g., an organisation, a club,
a team or a country) and this can influence the decisions, utility and produc-
tivity of individuals. Guilt also determines behaviour and, additionally, intro-
duces a dynamic component in the analysis of decision-making: guilt is basi-
cally a reaction to a past decision or a past event.
The combination of trust and fear has also generated some meaningful
contributions to the economic science, at various levels: Cox et al (2008) deal
with these emotions at an individual level, Busso (2014) relates them to the
role and legitimacy of institutions in contemporary societies, and Dearmon
and Grier (2009), Ozcan and Bjornskov (2011) and Bjornskov and Méon (2015)
explore their relation, mainly social trust, with the potential for economic
growth and development.
An important feeling related to trust and fear is shame. In Economics,
shame is present, e.g., in the analysis of poverty (Mathew 2010), in the study
of impulse buying (Yi and Baumgartner 2011) and in the debate on its role in
stimulating or inhibiting social cohesion (Jaffe et al 2015).
The last pair of emotions to contemplate in this brief literature review
is trust and joy. When combining these emotions, the theme of reciprocity
gains relevance. The economic implications of reciprocity have been
approached by various authors and include the studies of Ortmann et al
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(2000), Cox (2009),Kanagaretnam et al (2010), Akai and Netzer (2012) and
Charness and Shmidov (2014). The main message coming from these studies
is that, independently of the level of analysis (individual decision-making,
investment decisions by firms, state-level interactions) reciprocity and altru-
ism are evidenced, even in scenarios where pure rationality does not neces-
sarily recommend them as a means to maximise gains. Reciprocal behaviour
is more intensely found in market relations and institutional arrangements
where transparency and fairness dominate.
Looking at the opposite of trust and joy, there is the literature on sen-
timentality and remorse. In Eisenhauer (2004), Ho (2012) and Mungan (2012),
these issues are discussed. One aspect of this discussion concerns the diffi-
culty in quantifying such feelings. For instance, remorse may be measured
through apologies, but apologies are not always sincere; clearly, an informa-
tion asymmetry problem arises in this context.
The above survey on what can be called emotional economics has
unveiled a few facts:
i. Emotional economics is far from being a consolidated scientific field; the
contributions are dispersed and, typically, research efforts concentrate on
specific types of emotions rather than searching for an integrated view over
them;
ii. Emotions are pervasive in economic thought: they appear at the individ-
ual decision-making level, in shaping market relations, and in contributing
to the formation of macro outcomes;
iii. Emotions have to do with utility under uncertainty, but also with labour
productivity, investment decisions or the build-up of credibility of institu-
tions;
iv. Plutchik’s classification of emotions does not provide a perfectly fitting
framework to classify the existing contributions, but it is sufficiently flexible
to allow to group the relevant literature in terms of pairs of basic emotions,
as it is done in Table 1.
The next section takes a deeper look on the general properties of emo-
tions, highlighting three distinctive features: non-controllability, contagion
and pervasiveness.
4. THREE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES
The analysis so far has made it evident the multidimensional and multifaceted
character of human emotions. To gain further insights into the economic impli-
cations of emotions, in this section we isolate and discuss three relevant topics.
Each topic concerns the general nature of emotions and may be debated with-
out the need to isolate any of the elements in Figure 1 or Figure 2. Searching for
common traits on emotions is relevant because it allows for conceiving a rela-
tively general framework to approach emotions in economics. A sketch of a ten-
tative modelling framework, built upon the three features discussed in this sec-
tion and upon Plutchik’s classification, is proposed in Section 5.
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#1 -Non-controllability
Following Elster (1998), one can classify some emotions as valuable or useful
and some other emotions as undesirable and harmful. In this perspective, indi-
viduals will want to control their emotions, choosing to experience those that
provide positive outcomes and avoiding the ones that generate negative results.
Suggesting that emotions can somehow be tamed or controlled has
some appeal in the context of formal economic analysis, because in such cases
rationality and emotions might somehow be merged or mixed: a rational deci-
sion would imply selecting a positive emotion (e.g., joy) rather than a negative
emotion (e.g., sadness), or choosing a negative emotion (e.g., fear) to avoid
being confronted with a given unpleasant outcome (e.g., pain), or even rank-
ing different emotional states in the same way preferences are ranked (for
instance, ranking the emotional states as they appear in the axes of the
Plutchik’s wheel).
However, it is unreasonable to conceive emotions as completely con-
trollable. Individuals experience many negative emotions not because they
want to or do not try to avoid them, but because they cannot control many
aspects of life that lead them to the unpleasant circumstances that trigger
such negative emotions. In the words of Elster (1998 p.54),
It is generally agreed that emotions cannot be chosen in this sense. Emotions are
passively undergone (cp. the synonymous term ‘passion’) rather than actively cho-
sen. (...) One might try to save the claim that emotions can be chosen by stipulat-
ing that there are constraints on the choice or that the costs might be prohibitive.
These constraints and costs would in fact reflect, however, the involuntary nature
of the emotions.
In the model proposed in the following section, emotions are assumed
to be uncontrollable or involuntary, in consonance with the above argument.
Agents go through different emotional states over time, however such dynam-
ics are not mainly determined by a rational ability of the individual to control
her own emotions and respective evolution.
#2 - Contagion
If individuals do not control, in general terms, the emotions they experience,
where can we find the main drivers of emotional changes? Emotions are, basi-
cally, reactions to external events. Because people relate to one another and com-
municate in social and economic environments, emotions are, thus, shaped
essentially by local interaction. Emotions tend to spread as epidemics, with some
individuals, given the position they occupy and the capacities they have, being
able to influence the emotions of others. Citing, once again, Elster (1998 p 56),
If emotions are predictably triggered by beliefs about the external environment,
other people could try to induce emotions by manipulating either the beliefs or the
environment. The art of rhetoric, as practiced by orators and as analyzed in
Aristotle's Rhetoric, is largely about manipulating other people's emotional reac-
tions by shaping their beliefs.
O Gomes
- 50 -
Besides direct and intended influence, the contagion of emotions also occurs,
often, through mimicry. Individuals potentially adopt the emotions of others
just by observing what emotional states they are experiencing. This happens
as the result of empathy or as a tendency to cope with observable norms and
behaviour in society. In the model to present in Section 5, emotions dissemi-
nate through social contact, following a set of pre-established intuitive transi-
tion rules that are adapted from rumour propagation theory.
The fact that emotions are subject to contagion leads us to the third rel-
evant feature: the propagation of emotions might acquire an economy-wide
dimension, implying relevant aggregate consequences.
#3 - Pervasiveness
Most of the discussion in this paper so far suggests that emotion research in
Economics could be circumscribed, without any significant loss, to individual
decision-making and to the interaction between close neighbours. This is far
from being true. Many emotional states tend to propagate fast across large
populations, thus shaping aggregate phenomena. Episodes of collective
euphoria, indignation or fear recur in society, with obvious implications for
what the economy as a whole is able to accomplish. Economists are aware of
this association; Keynesian authors, for instance, strongly believe that psy-
chological factors, or, as they prefer to call them, animal spirits, are of primary
importance to explain the macro performance of the economy.
The influential book by Akerlof and Shiller (2009) offers a series of com-
pelling arguments about the extent to which collective emotions shape the tra-
jectories followed by national economies and even the pace of the global econ-
omy. These authors claim that a large array of noneconomic motives deter-
mines the evolution of the economy, their business cycles, the observable
unemployment rate or the overall investment levels. Such motives are, in the
words of the authors ‘thought patterns that animate people's ideas and feel-
ings, their animal spirits’ (p.1).
Five types of animal spirits, with impact on the macro economy, are
highlighted in the book, namely confidence, fairness, corruption and anti-
social behaviour, money illusion and stories. These aspects are not, in them-
selves, emotions (at least in that they are not present in the list of emotions
and feelings proposed in Section 2). They are, however, the direct consequence
of assuming that economic agents go through emotional experiences: senti-
ments of confidence and fairness are, typically, driven by emotions like trust
or anticipation; corruption and anti-social behaviour have their roots in feel-
ings like envy; money illusion is also linked with surprise and anticipation;
stories relate to what we have learned from what we and those we relate to
have lived in the past and the emotions these experiences bring.
By exploring each of the above elements, Akerlof and Shiller (2009) set
the foundations for a behavioural interpretation of the macro economy, an
interpretation where factors outside the scope of Economics are the funda-
mental causes of the most relevant economic processes. In this respect, we
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want to emphasise that emotions do matter for economics at all levels of
analysis and, thus, we adopt a broader view than the one suggested by Walde
(2015a p 2), when stating:
Economists analyse crime, family behaviour, excessive consumption behaviour
and addiction, bargaining behaviour, divorce, political campaigns and (the list
could be extended) strategic interaction between two individuals or in small groups.
And this is where the necessity of introducing emotions into economic analyses
originates. If decision making by economists was restricted to highly aggregate
macroeconomic situations or to situations where only costs and benefits play a
role, the standard model would be sufficient.
5. DYNAMICS OF EMOTIONAL STATES
In this section, a model of emotion dynamics, based on simple social interac-
tion rules, is formulated. The model is a meeting point between the three
generic properties of emotions discussed in Section 4 and the classification of
emotions as suggested by the Plutchik’s wheel.
Consider a specific axis of the Plutchik’s wheel. The axis we take is the
one relating to joy, but the analysis may equally apply to any other. Assume a
population of individuals where each element may be found in any of the iden-
tified emotional states of the joy class, and let:
• zt: share of individuals in a state of ecstasy;
• yt: share of individuals in a state of joy;
• xt: share of individuals in a state of serenity;
• wt: share of individuals in a state of pensiveness;
• vt: share of individuals in a state of sadness;
• ut: share of individuals in a state of grief.
The above densities comprise the whole population, i.e., z+y+x+w+v+u=1.
We assume that agents maintain their emotional state unless direct local
interaction with other individuals implies a change, given a set of simple inter-
action rules, which are adapted from rumour spreading theory (see Nekovee et
al 2007). These rules are as follows:
i) When someone in a state of serenity meets someone in a state of ecstasy, the
first is convinced to shift to the ecstasy category, with a given probability;
ii) When someone in a state of ecstasy establishes contact with someone who
is joyful or also in a state of ecstasy, enthusiasm loses strength and the first
falls to the state of joy, with a given probability;
iii) When someone in a state of joy meets someone in a state of serenity, the
first falls to the state of serenity, with a given probability;
iv) The above rules apply exactly in the same way for grief (instead of ecsta-
sy), sadness (instead of joy) and pensiveness (instead of serenity);
v) The mentioned transition probabilities might differ; however, to simplify
the analysis let them be all equal to λ (0,1);
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vi) When two individuals, located in the emotion states of serenity and pen-
siveness, meet, the transition may go either way, depending on a global
assessment the individuals make about overall emotions in the population.
This assessment requires formulating an emotion index, which will take the
form
The emotion index, Equation 1, is positive when joy dominates over
sadness, and negative in the opposite case. Note that in this index extreme
emotions (ecstasy and grief) have a stronger weight than intermediate emo-
tions (joy and sadness), and weak emotions (serenity and pensiveness) have a
lower weight still than intermediate emotions.
The following rule is adopted:
• When Et>Et-1, i.e., when joy, in its different intensities, is gaining weight
relatively to sadness, in its different intensities, the individual in the state of
pensiveness relocates to the serenity state with probability λ (0,1];
• When Et<Et-1, i.e., when joy, in its different intensities, is losing weight rel-
atively to sadness, in its different intensities, the individual in the state of
serenity relocates to the pensiveness state with probability λ (0,1];
• When Et=Et-1, no relocation takes place.
Note that the above changes in the aggregate emotions profile take place when
agents in the two states, serenity and pensiveness, meet.
Given the established rules, applying the law of mass action, and
assuming that the social network is homogeneous and of connectivity degree
equal to 1, emotion dynamics are presentable under the form of the following
system,
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(1)
∈ 
∈ 
(2)
The dynamics of the emotion shares will depend, given System (2), on
the initial values of the six variables and on the value of parameter λ. Consider
an initial state such that individuals are equally allocated to each of the emo-
tion shares: z0=y0=x0=w0=v0=u0=1/6. For these initial values, Figure 3 dis-
plays three dynamic long-term outcomes, for different values of parameter λ.
The graphics are drawn for 2,500 observations after excluding the transient
phase and they present the cumulative values of the emotion shares over time.
In the three examples, as for a large majority of the possible values of
the transition probability, endogenous fluctuations are seen. The endogenous
fluctuations outcome indicates that the interaction process produces persist-
ent emotion waves, with periods of prevailing joy alternating with periods of
dominant sadness.
For some values of the parameter (e.g., λ=0.25 or λ=0.9), a fixed-point
equilibrium is obtained; in this equilibrium, agents will fully locate on the
states of pensiveness (50 per cent), sadness (25 per cent) and grief (25 per
cent) or, alternatively, on the states of serenity (50 per cent), joy (25 per cent)
and ecstasy (25 per cent). Note that although this is a fixed-point equilibrium,
it does not imply that the individual agent will remain forever in the same emo-
tional state; she will evolve across emotional states, but in a way that her
departure from one state to another is always compensated for by the entry of
an individual in the first state and exit of an individual from the second state.
λ = 0.1
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Figure 3 - Emotion dynamics
cont...
...cont. λ = 0.2
λ = 0.4
Figure 4 displays, for λ=0.2, the time trajectory of the defined emotion
index, Et, over 2,500 long-term periods. Because emotion shares fluctuate, the
index will also fluctuate, with periods of dominant joy (Et>0) alternating with
periods where sadness prevails (Et<0).
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Figure 4: Time trajectory of the emotion index  (λ=0.2).
Consider next that the emotion axis surprise is subject to the same set of laws
of motion, that the initial distribution of agents across the respective emo-
tional states is also uniform, but that the transition probability across cate-
gories is given by parameter θ (not necessarily equal to λ). Continue to assume
λ=0.2 and take θ =0.175. Figure 5 draws the emotion index in both cases.
The observation of the trajectories in Figure 5 allows us to gain a notion about
the prevailing feeling in society according to the classification in the first dia-
gram of Figure 2: both indexes start with positive values, implying that the
dominant feeling in society is delight; after around 15 periods, sadness over-
comes joy, and thus delight is replaced by disappointment; near observation
500, joy becomes dominant again, but surprise is overcome by anticipation:
optimism replaces, at this point, the feeling of disappointment. Continuing the
comparison of the two trajectories, the following sequence of feelings is found
for the displayed trajectory: delight — disappointment — optimism — pes-
simism — disappointment — delight — optimism — pessimism — optimism —
delight.
6. THE INSTRUMENTAL VALUE OF EMOTIONS
The classification of emotions and the effort to address the dynamics of the
transition across emotional states based on such a classification, as discussed
in previous sections, are just the first steps of a potentially wider economic
research programme that eventually seeks understanding of the channels
through which emotions impact agents' decision-making processes. Section 3
and the literature review have already provided a few clues to identifying those
channels: emotion dynamics is a broad concept that includes the formation of
anticipatory feelings that affect utility, instantaneous mood swings that influ-
ence behaviour at work and in other socio-economic contexts, and also ex-
post reactions to outcomes that will, then, determine future decisions.
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Figure 5 - Time trajectories of the emotion indexes (joy and surprise).
In this section, a particular and meaningful channel linking emotions to
economic choices is highlighted, thus conveying some clues for a future exploration
of how Plutchik’s wheel may be employed as an instrument to understand better
individual and collective decision-making: this channel is attention. Although
attention is recognised in the literature as an important driver of economic deci-
sions (see, e.g., the macroeconomic rational inattention models of Sims 2003, and
Mackowiak and Wiederholt 2009, and, at the neuroeconomic research reviewed in
Fehr and Rangel 2011), its determinants are seldom associated with emotions.
Casual observation indicates the opposite: emotions and feelings, as characterised
and organised in Section 2, direct and guide attention and, thus, determine the
information and knowledge people acquire to evaluate their choices.
In Golman and Loewenstein (2015), the factors that influence the atten-
tion paid to a given question are enumerated. These are essentially three: impor-
tance, salience and surprise. All of them are, unarguably, shaped by emotions to
a large extent. The importance given to a certain event is, for instance, strongly
influenced by the position one occupies in the first axis of the wheel of emotions.
If, e.g., the event is going to a party or to a festival, the importance that will be
attributed to it, and thus the attention it will receive, will depend on the fact that
the individual is in a state of joy or, alternatively, in a state of sadness.
The notion of salience is associated with the degree to which the question
under scrutiny is influenced by the specific context or environment in which it
arises. Environmental issues impacting on attention are also identifiable in our
list of emotions. In particular, axes 2 and 3 in Figure 1 concern emotions that are
most suited to addressing this issue: states of trust, disgust, fear and anger fur-
nish the environmental factors that in many circumstances mould the salience
that a given question acquires and, hence, the attention that it receives.
Lastly, surprise is attached to the dynamics of information revelation
and it is also a driver of attention allocation. Besides being one of the three
factors that exert direct influence over the level of attention, it is also the pri-
mary emotion in the fourth axis of the wheel of emotions.
Accepting, as Golman and Loewenstein postulate, that the attention
assigned to an activated question is an increasing function of the three men-
tioned features — importance, salience and surprise — one confirms that partic-
ular emotional states are more amenable to generate higher attention levels to
specific questions or problems than others.
Our discussion on emotions crosses the Golman-Loewenstein reflection
also at a second level. These authors distinguish between two types of attention:
motivated attention, for which the desire to acquire information or knowledge
depends on the valence of the possible answers, and curiosity-driven attention,
which is associated with the human tendency to fill in information gaps even
when apparently the information has no direct usefulness. Again, in both cases,
emotions are of foremost importance.
People have the ability and the freedom to select what they think about.
They think about what can be useful for them but, essentially, they tend to
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focus attention on what is likely to generate positive rather than negative out-
comes. In other words, people seek information about questions with high-
valence answers, to the detriment of questions with low-valence answers.
Again, this observation highlights the role of emotions in attention allocation
and information search: individuals are not neutral about what they desire to
know and they do not collect information necessarily on the basis of its direct
material usefulness. Emotions are a strong determinant of motivated atten-
tion, as a few examples allow to clarify. A student will attribute more attention
to the date on which exam grades will be released when she is optimistic about
the expected result; fear of knowing about an eventual disease may lead a per-
son to avoid taking a medical exam; the willingness to meet someone will
depend on the underlying emotion relative to the other person (e.g., admira-
tion, trust, boredom or loathing).
In what concerns curiosity, we have already identified this as a feeling
in Plutchik’s wheel (Figure 2, class of feelings 5), emerging from the combina-
tion of trust and surprise. In fact, among the various feelings enumerated,
curiosity is probably the most relevant in directing attention. If information
gaps are significant and salient, people tend to allocate attention to them, even
in circumstances in which satisfying curiosity does not contribute much to
utility beyond the precise moment in which the information gap is filled.
Emotions change frequently, as agents experience the results of their
past decisions, as they interact in society, and as they perceive changes in the
surrounding environment. Mutations in emotional states may provoke sudden
and violent changes in the importance, salience and level of surprise associ-
ated with a problem, therefore generating relevant reallocations of attention,
both motivated attention and attention arising from mere curiosity. Attention,
in turn, is the key for problem-solving; problems receiving more attention are
those from which more valuable information and knowledge can be extracted,
allowing for better economic outcomes. It is in this context that we propose
Plutchik's wheel as a first step in the process of creating a unified theory of
emotions. Other steps must follow, namely regarding the paths through which
each emotion axis and each associated class of feelings determine awareness
and attention in society at all levels of analysis (individual, local market inter-
action and economy wide).
7. CONCLUSIONS
How can one introduce emotions into economic models in a meaningful way?
The question has no easy answer, given the multitude of emotions human
beings may experience, their intensities, the velocity with which they change
and the factors that drive them to change. A first useful step in the effort to
build an integrated theory of emotions in Economics consists of establishing
a clear classification of emotions. At this respect, it was argued that the ‘wheel
of emotions’ proposed by psychologist Robert Plutchik may be a suitable start-
ing point to organise ideas.
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One outstanding feature of the wheel of emotions is that it considers a
short list of basic emotions, each of them potentially subject to changes in
their respective intensity. By ordering the intensities of a given lineage of emo-
tions, one can then analyse and explore how individuals eventually evolve
from one intensity state to another. As discussed, the dynamics of emotions
are, in general, commanded by three strong ideas: emotions are non-control-
lable; emotions spread through social interaction; emotion contagion has soci-
ety or economy wide consequences.
In this paper, through a simple framework of analysis, we have attached
the transition between emotional states to the direct interaction among indi-
viduals, who will potentially change emotional states according to a simple set
of transition rules. The rules are designed in order to allow for endogenous
cyclical behaviour, such that the densities of agents in each emotion category
will be potentially subject to perpetual irregular endogenous fluctuations. The
deterministic bounded instability of emotions may, then, be a useful starting
point to analyse economic phenomena where it is evident that, as highlighted
by Akerlof and Shiller (2009), some non-economic motives determine the irreg-
ular and often unpredictable trajectories followed by economic variables.
Emotions influence the decisions of economic actors through a variety
of channels. Perhaps the most emphatic of these channels is attention.
Transitions across emotional states divert attention, making agents refocus
their goals and reorient the search for the information and knowledge that are
required to decide and prosper. Therefore, studying emotions is inseparable
from addressing attention, information and knowledge. An important avenue
for future research, in the context of the analysis pursued in this paper, will
be to formalise a framework where the transition across emotional states at
different locations of Plutchik’s wheel is associated with faster or slower
changes in the level of attention: while some emotion mutations are possibly
innocuous from the point of view of the attention relevant economic decisions
deserve, other changes might have substantial impact not only on everyday
life but also over aggregate outcomes.
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ENDNOTES
1.   Lisbon Accounting and Business School (ISCAL-IPL) and Business Research Unit
(BRU-ISCTE/IUL). Address: ISCAL, Av. Miguel Bombarda 20, 1069-035 Lisbon,
Portugal. E-mail: omgomes@iscal.ipl.pt. I gratefully acknowledge the helpful assistance
and guidance of the journal’s editors.
2. Many other, more or less detailed, categorisations of emotions can be found in the
psychology literature (see, e.g., Shaver et al 1987; Parrott 2001). 
3. Field evidence on the relation between emotions and economically motivated prefer-
ences, beliefs and decisions is reported on DellaVigna (2009).
Economic Issues, Vol. 22, Part 1, March 2017
- 59 -
REFERENCES
Ahrens S and Snower D J (2014) ‘Envy, guilt, and the Phillips curve’, Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 99, 69-84.
Akai K and Netzer R J (2012) ‘Trust and reciprocity among international groups: exper-
imental evidence from Austria and Japan’, Journal of Socio-Economics, 41, 266-276.
Akerlof G A and Shiller R J (2009) Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the
Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism, Princeton NJ: Princeton U P.
Ali S N (2011) ‘Learning self-control’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, 857-893.
Alvarez-Cuadrado F and Van Long N (2012) ‘Envy and inequality’, Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 114, 949-973.
Angeletos G M and La’O J (2013) ‘Sentiments’, Econometrica, 81, 739-779.
Antonetti P and Maklan S (2014) ‘Feelings that make a difference: how guilt and pride
convince consumers of the effectiveness of sustainable consumption choices’, Journal
of Business Ethics, 124, 117-134.
Battigalli P, Charness G and Dufwenberg M (2013) ‘Deception: the role of guilt’, Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 93, 227-232.
Bernheim B D and Thomadsen R (2005) ‘Memory and anticipation’, Economic Journal,
115, 271-304.
Bjornskov C and Méon P G (2015) ‘The productivity of trust’, World Development, 70,
317-331.
Bleichrodt H and Wakker P P (2015) ‘Regret theory: a bold alternative to the alterna-
tives’, Economic Journal, 125, 493-532.
Busso S (2014) ‘Modern institutions between trust and fear: elements for an interpre-
tation of legitimation through expertise’, Mind & Society, 13, 247-256.
Caplin A and Leahy J (2001) ‘Psychological expected utility theory and anticipatory
feelings’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 55-79.
Charness G and Shmidov V (2014) ‘Trust and reciprocity’, Foundations and Trends in
Microeconomics, 10, 167-207.
Cowley E (2013) ‘Forgetting the anxiety: gamblers’ reactions to outcome uncertainty’,
Journal of Business Research, 66, 1591-1597.
Cox J (2009) ‘Trust and reciprocity: implications of game triads and social contexts’,
New Zealand Economic Papers, 43, 89-104.
Cox J, Sadiraj K and Sadiraj V (2008) ‘Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for
modeling economic behavior’, Experimental Economics, 11, 1-24.
D’Orlando F, Ferrante F and Ruiu G (2011) ‘Culturally based beliefs and labor market
O Gomes
- 60 -
Economic Issues, Vol. 22, Part 1, March 2017
- 61 -
institutions’, Journal of Socio-Economics, 40, 150-162.
De Grauwe P (2012) ‘Booms and busts in economic activity: a behavioral explanation’,
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 83, 484-501.
Dearmon J and Grier K (2009) ‘Trust and development’, Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization, 71, 210-220.
DellaVigna S (2009) ‘Psychology and economics: evidence from the field’, Journal of
Economic Literature, 47, 315-372.
Eisenhauer J (2004) ‘Economic models of sin and remorse: some simple analytics’,
Review of Social Economy, 62, 201-219.
Elster J (1998) ‘Emotions and economic theory’, Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 47-74.
Ely J, Frankel A and Kamenica E (2015) ‘Suspense and surprise’, Journal of Political
Economy, 123, 215-260.
Epstein L G and Kopylov I (2007) ‘Cold feet’, Theoretical Economics, 2, 231-259.
Ert E, Creary S and Bazerman M H (2014) ‘Cynicism in negotiation: when communi-
cation increases buyers’ skepticism’, Judgment and Decision Making, 9, 191-198.
Faria J R (2011) ‘Emotions, happiness and growth: Spinoza, James and Ramsey’,
Economic Issues, 16, 81-92.
Fehr E and Rangel A (2011) ‘Neuroeconomic foundations of economic choice – recent
advances’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25, 3-30.
Gambetti E and Giusberti F (2012) ‘The effect of anger and anxiety traits on investment
decisions’, Journal of Economic Psychology, 33, 1059-1069.
Gershman B (2014) ‘The Two Sides of Envy’, Journal of Economic Growth, 19, 407-438.
Gifford Jr A (2002) ‘Emotion and self-control’, Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 49, 113-130.
Golman R and Loewenstein G (2015) ‘Curiosity, information gaps, and the utility of
knowledge’, Carnegie Mellon University working paper.
Gomes O (2015) ‘Sentiment cycles in discrete-time homogeneous networks’, Physica A,
428, 224-238.
Grolleau G, Mzoughi N and Sutan A (2009) ‘The impact of envy-related behaviors on
development’, Journal of Economic Issues, 43, 795-808.
Gul F (1991) ‘A theory of disappointment aversion’, Econometrica, 59, 667-686.
Ha S and Jang S J (2015) ‘National identity, national pride, and happiness: the case of
South Korea’, Social Indicators Research, 121, 471-482.
Hill K M, Fombelle P W and Sirianni N J (2016) Shopping under the influence of curios-
ity: how retailers use mystery to drive purchase motivation’, Journal of Business
Research, 69, 1028-1034.
O Gomes
- 62 -
Hirshleifer D (2001) ‘Investor psychology and asset pricing’, Journal of Finance, 56,
1533-1597.
Ho B (2012) ‘Apologies as signals: with evidence from a trust game’, Management
Science, 58, 141-158.
Jaffe K, Florez A, Manzanares M, Jaffe R, Gomes C, Rodriguez D and Achury C (2015)
‘On the bioeconomics of shame and guilt’, Journal of Bioeconomics, 17, 137-149.
Kahneman D and Thaler R H (2006) ‘Anomalies: utility maximization and experienced
utility’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20, 221-234.
Kanagaretnam K, Mestelman S, Nainar S M K and Shehata M (2010) ‘Trust and reciprocity
with transparency and repeated interactions’, Journal of Business Research, 63, 241-247.
Kim J Y, Lee H and Min I (2013) ‘The economics of curiosity’, Korean Economic Review,
29, 23-50.
Koszegi B and Rabin M (2007) ‘Reference-dependent risk attitudes’, American Economic
Review, 97, 1047-1073.
Lee Y C and Mao P C (2015) ‘Survivors of organizational change: a resource perspec-
tive’, Business and Management Studies, 1, 1-5.
Loewenstein G (2000) ‘Emotions in economic theory and economic behavior’, American
Economic Review, 90, 426-432.
Loewenstein G, O’Donoghue T and Rabin M (2003) ‘Projection bias in predicting future
utility’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 1209-1248.
Loomes G and Sugden R F (1982) ‘Regret theory: an alternative theory of rational
choice under uncertainty’, Economic Journal, 92, 805–824.
Loomes G and Sugden R F (1986) ‘Disappointment and dynamic consistency in choice
under uncertainty’, Review of Economic Studies, 53, 271-282.
Maccheroni F, Marinacci M and Rustichini A (2014) ‘Pride and diversity in social
economics’, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6, 237-271.
Mackowiak B and Wiederholt M (2009) ‘Optimal sticky prices under rational
inattention’, American Economic Review, 99, 769-803.
Magee W (2015) ‘Effects of gender and age on pride in work, and job satisfaction’,
Journal of Happiness Studies, 16, 1091-1115. 
Mathew L (2010) ‘Coping with shame and poverty’, Psychology and Developing
Activities, 22, 385-407.
Miettinen T and Suetens S (2008) ‘Communication and guilt in a prisoner’s dilemma’,
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52, 945-960.
Mungan M C (2012) ‘Don’t say you’re sorry unless you mean it: pricing apologies to
achieve credibility’, International Review of Law and Economics, 32, 178-187.
Nekovee M, Moreno Y, Bianconi G and Marsili M (2007) ‘Theory of rumor spreading in
complex social networks’, Physica A, 374, 457-470.
Ortmann A, Fitzgerald J and Boeing C (2000) ‘Trust, reciprocity, and social history: a
re-examination’, Experimental Economics, 3, 81-100.
Ozcan B and Bjornskov C (2011) ‘Social trust and human development’, Journal of
Socio-Economics, 40, 753-762.
Parrott W (2001) Emotions in Social Psychology, Philadelphia PA: Psychology Press.
Pawlowski T, Downward P and Rasciute S (2014) ‘Does national pride from interna-
tional sporting success contribute to well-being? An international investigation’, Sport
Management Review, 17, 121-132.
Plutchik R (1980) A Psycho-evolutionary Synthesis, New York: Harper and Row.
Plutchik R (2001) ‘The nature of emotions’, American Scientist, 89, 344-350.
Ruiu G (2014) ‘The perverse effect of fatalism on entrepreneurial selection’, Economics
Bulletin, 34, 901-922.
Shapiro J and Wu S (2011) ‘Fatalism and savings’, Journal of Socio-Economics, 40, 645-
651.
Shaver P, Schwartz J, Kirson D and O’Connor C (1987) ‘Emotion knowledge: further
exploration of a prototype approach’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52,
1061-1086.
Sims C A (2003) ‘Implications of rational inattention’, Journal of Monetary Economics,
50, 665-690.
Sunstein C R (1998) ‘Selective fatalism’, Journal of Legal Studies, 27, 799-823.
Thaler R H (2000) ‘From homo economicus to homo sapiens’, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 14, 133-141.
Walde K (2015a) ‘Emotion research in economics’, Mainz: Johannes-Gutenberg
University Mainz.
Walde K (2015b) ‘Stress and coping: an economic approach’, Mainz: Johannes-
Gutenberg University Mainz.
Wigniolle B (2014) ‘Optimism, pessimism and financial bubbles’, Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 41, 188-208.
Yi S and H Baumgartner (2011) ‘Coping with guilt and shame in the impulse buying
context’, Journal of Economic Psychology, 32, 458-467.
Zizzo D J (2008) ‘Anger and economic rationality’, Journal of Economic Methodology, 15,
147-167.
Economic Issues, Vol. 22, Part 1, March 2017
- 63 -

